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FOREWORD
Since the Naval War College was founded in 1884, the study of
International La'v has been an important part of its curriculum.
From 1894 to 1900, certain lectures given on International Law together 'vith the situations studied were compiled and printed, but
'vith very limited distribution. Commencing in 1901, ho·wever, the
first formal volume of the Naval vVar College's "Blue Book" series
'vas published.
This book represents the fifty-sixth volume in the series as numbered for cataloging and reference purposes. The present volume is
written by Professor Neill H. Alford, Jr. of the University of Virginia School of La,v, 'vho occupied the Chair of International Law
at the Naval War College during the 1961-1962 academic year. It is
considered that Professor Alford's book presents an excellent, informative, and comprehensive work in the field of economic 'varfare.
The opinions expressed in this volume are those of the author and
are not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War
College. The fact of publication does not imply endorsement of content but indicates merely that the subject treated is one 'vhich merits
attention.

T. HAYWARD
17ice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, N a~val War 0 ollege
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PREFACE
1"'he manuscript for this book 'vas commenced in the spring of 1962
and substantially completed in the fall of 1964. Economic 'varfare
and its political environ1nent changes rapidly and parts of this book
·will certainly be obsolete before its publication. Strangely anachronistic references 'vill be found to "Soviet" and "Sino-Soviet Blocs."
'"fhese may have existed in 1962 but could hardly be said to exist
today. The book 'vas completed before the United States became
heavily involved in Vietnam and reflects no substantial part of our
experience there. The lengthy discussion of economic warfare with
Cuba through sugar-market controls breaks off in 1962, although
supervening events tend to bear out the writer's observations. N ational institutions for trade control have altered somewhat since the
writer described them in Chapter II. All in all, a highly fluid area
is difficult to write about, although the 'vriter comforts himself 'vith
the hope that his basic analysis of economic 'varfare, the relation of
this analysis to legal institutions, and the relation of both to naval
decision making, may become increasingly relevant as relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China
continue their process of change.
Work on the book was commenced during the administration of
Vice Admiral Bernard L. Austin, USN, as President of the Naval
War College. Admiral Austin's intimate knowledge of naval decision
making and interest in la'v proved stimulating to the 'vriter during
his year of Residence. The writer's thanks are also due to Vice
Admiral Charles L. Melson, USN, and Vice Admiral John T.
Hayward, USN, Presidents of the Naval War College, who have
extended him its facilities and have shared infinite patience with his
delays to which lawyers unfortunately are prone.
During his tenure at the Naval War College the 'vriter profited
greatly from his opportunities to discuss and argue points of international law of naval interest with Commander (now Captain)
Charles R. Davis, USN, and is heavily indebted to a series of classes
of officers at the Naval War College bet,veen 1962 and 1965 whose
international legal problems are reflected in this book.
The burden of preparing the manuscript for publication and of
v
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soliciting comments upon it has :fallen upon Commander Henry S.
Palau, USN, and Lieutenant Commander Joseph M. Battaglino,
USN. It is sufficient to say that without their editorial help the book
would never have been published.
The materials in substantially the :form presented here were also
submitted in partial fulfillment o:f the requirements for an advanced
degree in law at the Yale Law School. In this connection, Professor
Myres S. McDougal and Dr. B. S. Murty o:f the Yale Law School
read the original manuscript and made many helpful suggestions.
Dean Hardy Cross Dillard o:f the University o:f Virginia Law School
has done much to encourage the ·writer to press :forward with his
work on this book and to seek its publication.
Two Elizabeth Al:fords have been extremely patient with the writer
as the book was in preparation and his gratitude to them is here
acknowledged.
Responsibility :for what appears in the book rests entirely upon the
\vriter.
NEILL

University o:f Virginia
The Law School
Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable
Foundation Professor o:f I...~a w

H.

ALFORD, JR.

INTRODUCTION
Modern econo1nic 'varfare is "material resource" ·w arfare. Modern
economic warfare involves intentional disturbances of the flow of
material resources among people and of the processes by which these
resources are used to produce values. Under the rubric "modern economic warfare" are embraced such apparently disparate practices as
the preemption of scientific kno,vledge and skill to deny them to an
adversary and interferences 'vith _the transport of materials, such as
nuclear and biological weapons, not regarded as 'vealth in a conventional sense. Traditionally, economic warfare has been associated
with manipulations of wealth to affect power. But these manipulations are treated in this book as disturbances of processes by "\vhich
resources are used to produce values through the medium of "\Vealth.
Modern economic warfare is similar in its major features to economic warfare 'vaged in the past. Differences stem from the fact
that modern economic warfare is waged during a period of general
military stalemate. This military stalemate is of uncertain duration.
It is subject to intentional or inadvertent disturbances, being based
upon a balance between major adversaries in arsenals of ultradecisive 'veapons of a nuclear, biological and chemical nature'.
Thus, when modern economic "\Varfare is '"aged during insurgencies, counterinsurgencies and "limited" 'vars, coercive economic practices may escalate into violent po,ver exchanges. When this escalation
is not desired by the policy makers concerned, there is a premium
upon selecting econon1ic warfare techniques 'vhich reduce the risk
of escalation to a minimum.
The writer seeks to demonstrate in Part I of this book that economic warfare by "protracted harassment," the usual posture o£ the
United States· and other major powers when employing economic
coercion, has been rendered marginally effective, prohibitively costly
and extremely hazardous by political and technical changes. He
recommends, as an alternative to economic warfare by "protracted
harassment," preference for econo1nic 'varfare by "economic sortie."
Economic warfare by "economic sortie" has been 'vaged frequently
and effectively in the past. It is adaptable to current "military stalemate" conditions whether or not employed concomitantly to limited
military hostilities.
In Part II of this book, principles developed and discussed 1n
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Part I are applied in a series of hypothetical cases in which naval
officers participate in decision making, often simply in an advisory
capacity, at various policy levels. The convenience of the casual
reader has been sacrificed to realism by developing the hypotheticals
in factual sequence. Consequently, a reader referring to a single
hypothetical will perhaps find useful a review of the preceding fact
situation.
Two islands (logical targets for economic 'varfare by sea) figure
in the hypotheticals. These are Nueva and Antioka, adjacent and
fictitious countries, placed in the Western Hemisphere only to involve
in the discussions the Organization of American States. A map appears at the beginning of Part II and as Appendix A.
The situations commence with naval activity relating to a civil
disturbance in Neuva in 'vhich property of United States citizens is
threatened with loss. The situations then progress through a civil
war in Nueva which results in overthro'v of its government by the
insurgents; strained relations between the new government in Nueva
and Antioka; development of Nueva as a Scythian satellite, Scythia,
also a fictitious state, appearing as a major political adversary of the
United States; overthrow of the Antiokan government by Nueva
with Scythian aid; and end with a series of hypotheticals in which
the United States establishes a naval blockade of Antioka and Nueva
and later participates in peace enforcement action against Antioka
and Nueva by the Organization of American States under the Rio
Pact.
The purpose of the book is to alert naval officers to the bearing of
la"? upon economic 'varfare confrontations and to demonstrate to
them how law relates to the discharge of their economic warfare
duties. No economic warfare primer is attempted, although in concentrating upon decision making at low policy levels and in relating
law to this process, the writer found useful a delineation of major
principles of strategy and tactics in economic 'varfare. Other commentators, stressing either the use of economic warfare techniques to
support military operations or the impact of economic 'varfare upon
national economies, have not attempted this emphasis.
In hammering out his own provisional and crude frame,vork of
strategy and tactics in economic warfare, the "~Titer is a "Tare he has
trampled upon niceties of economic theory with Gothic abandon.
Perhaps those better equipped for the task will recognize the need
for principles of economic 'varfare to guide executive officers at all
levels of government and 'vill provide a more 'vorkable and satisfactory analysis.
The use of naval power in economic 'varfare is familiar. Admiral
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Mahan, in his classic The Influence of Sea Po~wer Upon History*** 1
defined ·w ith infinite care the relationships bet,veen naval po,ver and
the distribution and use o£ material resources. Sharing 'vith other
19th century thinkers the conviction that principles o£ growth, useful
to explain the past and guide predictions o£ the future, could be discovered by a sophisticated and diligent analysis o£ value processes,
Mahan related naval power to principles o£ political change discoverable in processes for producing and using material resources.
Whether ""~ealth" principles provide complete explanations o£
events in the past or sound guidelines for forecasts o£ the future are
matters no'v hotly disputed. But, in addition to securing deserved
recognition o£ the influence o£ navies in history, quite apart from
their sporadic use in war to destroy the people and commerce o£ an
enemy, Mahan articulated an enduring relationship bet,veen navies
and the distribution and use o£ material resources. This relationship
deserves attention 'vhen the United States Navy is considered as a
force to execute a national policy o£ "graduated response to coercion."
However, Mahan's advocacy o£ the need for a revival o£ United
States naval strength, 'v hich had fallen into desuetude in the late
19th century, led him to define the mission o£ a naval establishment
primarily as one o£ trade protection. This was a modest demand,
ably attuned to the trend o£ American thought and the changing
political position o£ the United States.
Many Americans o£ Mahan's day questioned the necessity even for
the feeble fleet then flying our flag. They shared, nevertheless, a
pervasive belie£ that a major purpose o£ government was positive,
but benign and unobtrusive, protection o£ private activity in producing, transporting and using 'vealth.
Sensitive to this opinion, and foreseeing a stimulus to American
interest in sea trade following completion o£ the then contemplated
Isthmian canal, Mahan accurately and effectively projected an image
of the Navy as the indispensable protector o£ sea commerce. His arguments supported claims by the Navy to an increasing share o£ the
national budget during the lean fiscal years preceding the SpanishAmerican War and during the period o£ almost equal general military impoverishment preceding World War I. Educated by Mahan
to the intimate relationship bet,veen a powerful Navy and the peaceful maintenance and expansion o£ sea commerce, the American taxpayer bore his increasing financial burden 'vith little complaint.
Influenced also by Mahan's definition o£ the purpose o£ a United
States naval establishment, the Navy accepted the strategic and
tactical concept o£ "organic" operational control advocated by Mahan
1

Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1789 (1890).
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and a number of his contemporaries. "Organic" ad1ninistrative control had prevailed in the Navy for many years. But many officers,
particularly senior officers of Civil War vintage, adhered staunchly
to the concept that the normal and proper employment of naval
po-\ver 'vas by the dispatch of individual cruisers for raids upon
enemy commerce.2 Mahan and others, who vie,ved the mission of the
Navy principally as one of protecting sea carriers to and from
American ports, saw centralized operational control as an essential
institution to accomplish this end.
By the time of the Spanish-American War the "Mahan concept"
w·as beginning to prevail. The fla1nboyant individualism of independent naval operators, such as Cushing, 'vas on the 'vane. Efficient
electronic communications sealed the victory of ~'organic" operational
control.
Reasonably "'ell-financed, in part at least as an outgro,vth of
Mahan's effective public appeaJ, the Navy kept abreast of improvements in naval hard,vare. Coupled ·with this "'as adherence to a ne'v
tactical and strategic concept 'vhich proved effectively geared to the
requirements of major naval w·arfare in the early 20th century. During World War I, the protection of commerce, as Mahan had foreseen, 'vas the dominant mission of the United States Navy; and
although World War II imposed diverse requirements upon the
Navy, commerce protection again demanded a significant part of its
effort.
The nuclear age has reinforced the importance of "organic" operational control. But features of existing and potential military confiict in the nuclear age have revived a shadow of the old decentralized
decision making fan1iliar in the early period of Mahan's naval career.
The more dramatic aspects of this current individualization of policy
making inhere in such current naval functions as the use of naval
units to strike, by means of aircraft or missiles, deep within continental land masses and the provision of second-strike capabilities by
units at sea. Yet changes of greater subtlety also are occurring.
In the past, naval officers have figured in economic 'var£are most
prominently 'vhile maintaining blockades, enforcing contraband lists
and preventing unneutral service during general hostilities. During
World Wars I and II, as " 'ill be pointed out in further detail in
Chapter V, there 'vas a shift in the responsibility for major economic
'Yarfare decision n1aking from the sea officer to administrative officers
ashore. ·T he administration of economic ·warfare was centralized and
an effort was made to apply administrative controls to contraband at
2

See Mahan, From Sail to Steam, 271 ( 1907).
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source-or before the contraband was shipped by sea. Under these
circumstances, the "policy-voices" of naval officers 'vere muted.
It had al,vays been necessary for naval officers to have some understanding of economic warfare other than that immediately involved
in their sea duties. This requirement exists today. All economic 'varfare tends to evolve to,vards defensive or offensive postures by adversaries requiring an interdiction of sea or air transport. The naval
administrative (NAVAD) blockades of World Wars I and II were
founded in part upon economic 'varfare postures of the contestants
antedating military hostilities. While the diverse backgrounds of
officers on blockade duty during the two great wars did not provide
an officer corps well versed in general economic warfare techniques,
the better the grasp by an officer of the administrative framework
for ~conomic warfare, the more efficiently he performed his duties.
All economic 'varfare practices tend to interrelate-and effective or
ineffective action in one zone of economic warfare is likely to be
reflected in others.
Yet modern economic warfare, waged during insurgencies, counterinsurgencies and limited "!ars, is conducted without the major administrative structures which have been hastily assembled during the
two great world conflicts and as hastily demolished at the end of
them. Although the United States is prepared because of its extensive
resources to wage economic warfare, it is deficient in economic warfare organization and theory. Our greatest neglect in this area has
been our failure to recognize economic warfare as a coercive practice
pattern deserving the attention of a permanent corps of professionals.
Absent such a corps of economic 'varfare professionals, the burden
to grasp economic ·warfare theory and develop and use economic
warfare techniques tends to rest heavily upon military officers-and
particularly upon those in the naval service because of the intimate
relation between naval po,ver and the transport and use of material
resources so ably spelled out by Mahan. In none of the other military
services does the spectrum of decision making responsibility in economic warfare range from the situation in which tight central control leaves little discretion to the commander to the situation in which
this commander is likely to find an economic warfare decision of the
greatest national importance resting squarely upon his shouldersnor in the other military services do these situations tend to shift
with equal rapidity.
Furthermore, the tasks required of naval officers have become remarkably diverse in the nuclear age. In the time of Mahan, it was
sufficient for a naval officer in a senior command position to be a good
seaman and able fighter. Today he may have to serve as a diplomat or
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political advisor or may perform sundry other tasks having political
overtones required by the exigencies of a situation. He must understand the entire power structure in which he operates and cannot
limit his study or inquiry simply to the details of naval administration and organization.
It is this new trend back to a form of decentralized decision making compatible with "organic" operational control, coupled with the
increasingly diverse responsibilities which a naval officer is expected
to discharge, which justifies an emphasis upon "legal strategy" in
economic warfare at the comparatively low policy level here considered. In economic warfare which involves naval sea and air power
only provisionally or peripherally, naval officers, although perhaps
filling roles less conspicuous than those of civilian officials, may participate in economic warfare policy making as advisors even when
not participating as commanders.
When one examines the minutiae of an economic warfare transaction-and a major effort to do this is made in this book-it is
apparent that most of the critical decisions-those from which there
is no turning back-are made at the level of application (or execution) of economic warfare policy. It is at this point that a naval
officer is most likely to participate as an advisor or commander. As
administrators, these officers also engage in administrative or "effective" lawmaking as they apply their orders to the facts.
The major responsibility of any military officer, including those in
the Navy, is to understand and execute legal orders given them by
their military or civilian commanders. A military officer has no
license to formulate his o"\vn "law" or to engage in legal experiment.
But in discharging his professional responsibilities, the officer becomes, consciously or not, both a contributor of new legal institutions
and an assayer of existing legal institutions. As an "administrative
lawmaker," a naval officer may contribute concretely to developing
legal doctrines and techniques which take current facts and postulated future facts realistically into account. He may also induce
, authoritative decision makers to reject legal doctrine that has become irrelevant to contemporary fact. The process by which these
developments occur is described in greater detail in Chapter I of this
book. The process is as difficult to escape as it is to describe; although
to suggest a naval officer may. make new law, rather than simply
administer laws passed or proclaimed by a constitutional body or
civilian officer, appears superficially to invite unwarranted breaches
of the mercurially sensitive lines defining civil-military relationships.
An understanding by naval officers of the distinctions between
formal and effective lawmaking functions may sharpen their appre-
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ciation of the importance of impingements of "law" upon economic
warfare missions. Such an understanding may also dispel any f alse
image these officers may entertain of "la·w" as an arbitrary or unreasonable restriction upon imaginative measures in economic warfare.
While a naval officer's participation in "legal strategy" in economic
·w arfare usually occurs at the administrative or operational level as a
commander or staff officer, he may participate in formulating economic warfare policy, including its legal elements, on a formal basis
and at a high executive, legislative or judicial echelon. Rarely, he
will serve as a member of a court or commission dealing with economic warfare policy. Perhaps he will be a delegate to an international convention dealing 'vith legal issues in economic warfare from
the perspective of the general _c ommunity. Typically, however, his
participation in economic warfare policy making on a formal level
will be advisory only.
Thus, he may have special knowledge concerning some confrontation in which an application of economic warfare techniques is considered. His advice may then be sought at high executive levels. He
may testify before a Congressional committee which seeks to define
an economic 'varfare problem of naval interest and devise legislation
to deal with it. He may offer testimony before courts. In one relatively recent ·case before the World Court, testimony by naval officers
(none of them from the United States) had an important bearing
upon the decision. 3
In his participation in policy making at the various informal and
formal policy levels 1nentioned, a naval officer deals with both national and international law. The major obstacle to his effective use
of "legal strategy" is his tendency to regard national and international law simply as net,vorks of rules to regulate conduct.
For this reason, Chapter I of this book offers a brief survey of the
participants in economic 'varfare, their objectives and techniques and
the conditions under which these techniques are e·m ployed. Chapter
II then bears upon claims and counterclaims opposed in economic
warfare and ·processes by 'vhich con1munity decisions concerning
these claims and counterclaims are formulated.
In Chapter II the confrontation bet,veen the United States and
Cuba concerning elimination of the Cuban sugar quota in the United
States closed market is used as a framework for discussion. Although
conflict concerning a sugar quota seems at first glance to have little
3

The Corfu Channel Case, mentioned at page 371 infra. For a roster of the
witnesses (British, French, Dutch, Swedish, Norwegian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav) and a summary of their testimony, see Alford, "Fact Finding by the
World Court," 4 Villanova Law Review, 37, 69-74 (1958).
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relevance to participation by a naval officer in economic 'varfare, it
facilitates an examination of Communist economic 'varfare techniques with which naval officers are vitally concerned and an examination also of United States law bearing principally upon "defensive" economic 'varfare. The "sugar encounter" demonstrates how
coercive economic techniques tend to escalate towards situations requiring naval action and displays the complexity of decision making
in economic warfare waged by the United States.
There is no attempt in Part I or in the problems developed in
Part II to do more than examine "legal strategy" in economic 'varfare from the decision-making perspective of a participating United
States naval officer. Thus, the concentration is upon "claim processes":
Who are the claimants and counterclaimants in e.c onomic coercion?
What types of claims are asserted? In what conflict situations are
they asserted? What strategies are emphasized? And what are the
outcomes? Since legal strategy in economic warfa.re is emphasized,
there is also concentration upon the processes of "decision" concerning these claims; but no effort is made to view the instrument of
economic coercion in multiperspective as part of a world social and
power process.
Policy statements by decision makers in the general community
concerning economic 'varfare are quite sparse. It has been difficult in
the past to generate issues in economic 'varfare 'vhich could be presented to an organ of the general community for decision. Moreover,
the economic practices of the United States (coercive and persuasive)
apparently thus far have been compatible 'vith the demands of the
general community; although this 'vill not necessarily continue to be
the case. If divergences occur, and as general community policy is
gradually formulated in this area, analyses of economic 'varfare from
a general community perspective, clarifications of general community
policy and recommendations for alternative policies and procedures
will become of increasing value. The ground,vork in this book may
facilitate a more ambitious analysis.
A multiperspective study, for example, will require the "economic
instrument of coercion" to be located within the pattern of community coercive processes. The participants, their immediate and ultimate objectives, the conflict situations, the strategies of the participants and the effects of these strategies all should be accurately
defined. The claim processes, as considered in this book, should then
be examined, with emphasis, ho,vever, not simply upon the role in
this process of a single type of executive officer, but upon the full
spectrum of national claims and counterclaims and claims and counterclaims by participants other than states. The process of decision

9

likewise should be examined in detail from the perspective of the
territorially organized communities and also from the perspectives
of officials of international organizations and tribunals: their obj ectives; decisional situations; strategies; and the, outcomes of their
decisions being considered. An analysis in detail, such as this, might
then pe,r mit a rational clarification of policy for the general community with alternative policies and procedures suggested in the
light of current trends and conditions.

